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CHURCH RESPONSES IN EASTERN EUROPE TO GORBACHEV'S REFORMS
"THE LIBERALIZING CONTEXT: HUNGARY"

By Leslie Laszlo
Dr. Leslie Laszlo (Roman Catholic) is a professor of political science at the Loyola
campus of Concordia University, Montreal, Que. Canada. He is a native of Hungary
and a member of OPREE's editorial advisory board. His previous articles were
published in OPREE Vol. I. No. 5 (September, 1981) and Vol. I, No. 6 (November,
1981). This was a paper prepared for the 21st National Convention of the American
Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies (AAASS) to be held in Chicago,
Illinois, November 2-5, 1989.

Mikhail Gorbachev did not bring reforms to Hungary since in Hungary these were
initiated years before his arrival to power in the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, his call for
glasnost, perestroika and democratization strengthened the hands of the reformers and helped
to speed up their time-table. Gorbachev's repeated assurances of non-interference in the
internal affairs of other socialist countries 1 seem to have removed the threat of Soviet
intervention, the dread of a repeat of 1956 in Hungary, or 1968 in Czechoslovakia. This
renunciation of the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine was bound to embolden the reformers, while
it must have disheartened the remaining die-hard Stalinists. In any event, the effect on
Hungary was an upsurge of ever louder demands for sweeping reforms in all spheres of
public life, including religion.
It should be noted that while the Communist leaders of Hungary accepted the need for
thoroughgoing reforms already in the 1960's , it was done primarily because of economic
necessity. But then they were forced, however reluctantly, to broaden the scope of "new
thinking" to encompass other areas that lie far beyond their original intentions. As it was,
the Hungarian movement toward reform time and again stalled and even reversed 2 until the
pent up frustration over unfulfilled expectations burst forth with force in all directions.
The Gates Open ...

The need to involve the Churches in remodeling and revitalizing the stagnant society has
been widely recognized. Since 1985, new regulations regarding church-state relations had

been promised by the state authorities. 3 In their view the "agreements" between the State and
the Churches dating back to 1948-1950, were obsolete and no longer enforced. In spite of
this, nothing was done for years to change the situation--proof that religion was not among
the priorities on the agenda either of the reform-minded Communists, or of the emerging
"opposition."4 Nevertheless, in the context of demands for human rights and democratic
freedoms, the question of freedom of conscience, including freedom of religion and the free
activity of the Churches, was bound to and , indeed did emerge, as one of the basic premises
of true democracy.
The course of events took a dramatic turn in the beginning of 1988 when the extent of
Hungary's foreign indebtedness and the rapidly approaching bankruptcy of her economy had
been revealed. This meant the end of the borrowed prosperity of recent years, of the much
touted "Goulash communism"--a hard blow for the Hungarian consumer who was totally
unprepared for such calamity. The old guard around Janos Kadar was now in full retreat, 5
the reformers within the HSWP (Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party) were gaining decisive
influence over policy making, and the opposition groups were clamoring for radical changes
not only in samizdat publications but also in well-publicized public meetings and even in the
government owned media. Interestingly, the call for freedom of conscience and for the end
of government-imposed restrictions on the free exercise of religion came louder through the
government media, especially on the pages of the daily Magyar Nemzet, than in the
statements and publications emanating from the Churches. These latter remained tame and
extremely cautious in face of the avalanche of reform ideas and the actual changes which
were rumbling on.
Prime Minister K aroly Grosz invited church leaders to a meeting to discuss with
government officials pending legislation on church polity. 6 This meeting, which took place
in his own office at the parliament building on March 14, 1988, was the first step toward
constructive dialogue between the government and Churches.
On this occasion, during a three-hour-long discussion with the Prime Minister, Primate
Laszlo Paskai, the recently named Archbishop of Esztergom, recommended that the projected
bill be of regulative and not restrictive character.

Furthermore, he asked that the state

should ensure the freedom for the Churches which is necessary for them to function
according to their nature. This ability to function implies, according to the Primate, all that
the Church needs to exercise its mission, i.e., freedom of worship, of teaching, of association
(including religious orders), of maintaining schools, publishing houses, and access to the
electronic media. He also asked the Prime Minister for legislation to permit conscientious
objectors to perform an "alternative service" instead of bearing arms. 7 Bishop J6zsef Szendi
of Veszprem was more outspoken.

He reminded the Prime Minister that the existing

agreements with the state were signed by an intimidated hierarchy under duress. He called
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for new, equitable legislation, for the removal of all restrictions on religious instruction, and
for the freedom to re-establish all the religious orders which were dissolved by government
decree. Furthermore, he demanded unrestricted opportunity for the Church to work with
the youth and for Catholic youth organizations to function and to have their own journals.
This intervention by Bishop Szendi was published only in "samizdat" form, but it quickly
spread all over the country, and not just among Catholics.8
Shortly after his historic meeting with the church representatives Karoly Grosz was
elected on May 23, 1988, by a special Party Conference of the HSWP to replace Janos Kadar
as General Secretary of the Party. Thus, he became the leader of both the Party and of the
government. 9 In mid-August, according to press reports, Primate Paskai, who received the
Cardinal's hat from Pope John Paul II on June 28, 1988 , was notified by the government in
a letter about all the salient features included in the Law on Church Policy being drafted. 10
The letter said that the government's aim was "regulation" rather than "restriction" of
religious life, and it asked for "active participation of the Churches" in preparing the draft,
stating that "only a Church that functions properly can be effective in helping us realize our
social goals."

The letter holds out the prospect of "legal guarantees for the autonomous

activity of the Churches" and the elimination of "all discrimination on account of religious
belief," including discrimination against teachers for their religious convictions. As a further
concession, the Churches would no longer be required to request state permission to hold
religious instruction for the young or to report the names of those taking part to the
authorities. Moreover, religious instruction would no longer be restricted to Sundays. The
proposed law would lift the present limit on the number of pupils in church schools including
those run by Catholic monastic orders. Teachers in church schools would no longer have to
reapply for a new work p-e rmit each year but would receive a one-time unlimited permit.
According to the letter, the government was planning to "reduce the number of church
positions requiring state approval" and to ease restrictions on church building, repairs and
receiving gifts from abroad. Churches would no longer need permission to organize public
religious festivities and processions but would only have to notify the authorities of the dates
and places. Bishops would no longer be required to submit their circulars to state censors.
The government also indicated that it was prepared to allow clergymen wider access to
minister in hospitals, convalescent homes, and possibly in prisons and reformatories.
In two important areas, the government showed itself still reluctant to make concessions.
First, the letter made it clear that some of the monastic orders outlawed in 1950 would not
be "relegalized" although they did not rule out the possibility of re-establishing some others.
Second, the letter did not promise to fulfill the Churches' long-standing wish to increase
their publishing activities but said that the question would be examined.
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The limits of the government's new-found generosity were demonstrated i n the
repercussions to an article written by Bishop Endre Gyulay of Szeged-Csanad entitled, "With
Understanding and Patience," published in the government daily Magyar Hirlap on July 13,
1988. In that Gyulay challenged the authorities to "speak about the mistakes, abuses, and
wrong-doings of their "predecessors'," and to "acknowledge publicly that they need a living
church able to do its work." Only this "would guarantee that (the authorities) words are not
tactical tricks." Gyulay also demanded the rehabilitation of church figures condemned in
show trials, writing that such a gesture "would help heal the wounds that the Church still
bears." He ended his article with an emphatic plea: for an end of all discrimination, especially
in the hiring practices towards religious believers. Gyulay's article drew a public rebuke
from the Chairman of the State Office for Chl;lrch Affairs, Imre Miklos. At the reception
in honor of Primate Paskai's elevation to Cardinal, Miklos broke into a tirade against a
"Bishop, who sought popularity by publishing in a newspaper some pathetic and rhetorical
questions that do not speak well of his leadership qualities."11 Gyulay's answer to Miklos'
personal attack was not long in coming. In a speech at a birthday celebration the bishop
repeated his conviction that "the era of blind subservience toward the authorities" was over.
"The spirit of the new age bids us to speak out," he said. "We all have this responsibility." 1 2
There was evidently a new era dawning in church-state relations, affecting also the
Protestant Churches which began re-claiming some of their "nationalized" schools. The new
spirit of greater tolerance and even cooperation in a growing number of issues was reflected
in a plethora of scholarly conferences and celebrations organized jointly by church and state
organs, as well as in the way the media reported these events. Apart from such international
gatherings as the Congress of the Lutheran World Federation in 1984, the International
Symposium of Marxist and Catholic Scholars in 1986, the Meeting of the Executive of the
World Jewish Congress in 1987, the General Assembly of the World Federation of Bible
Societies in 1988 - all of which were held in Budapest, a city vying to become an
international convention center - there had been symposia on Hungarian subjects which had
been either neglected previously, or were given an unabashedly biased Marxist interpretation.
An example of the re-evaluation of the Church's role in Hungary's past was the Peter
Pazmany symposium organized jointly by the Bishops' Conference, the Academy of Sciences
and the University of Budapest, February 29 - March 12, 1988. Peter Cardinal Pazmany,
who died 350 years ago, was the leader of the Counter-Reformation in 17th century
Hungary.

Founder of Budapest University and numerous other schools, he was a great

patriot, politician, orator and writer.

He, more than anyone else in his time, helped to

transform the archaic structure of medieval Hungarian to an easily flowing modern idiom.
After World War II, for obvious reasons, the name of this Catholic prelate, a giant in
Hungarian history, was barely mentioned, while his great contributions to Hungarian culture

4

were minimized if not altogether ignored.

Now, however, Cardinal Pazmany was

rehabilitated by the Marxist and non-Marxist participants in the symposium and, figuratively
speaking, he was restored to his pedesta1. 1 3 Shortly after this event, and perhaps inspired by
it, a Workshop of Church History was created with the participation of Marxist and non
Marxist, Catholic and Protestant historians.
Over and above the propitious beginnings of a real thaw in church-state relations, the
year 1988 had a special significance for the Hungarian Catholic Church. In addition to the
celebrations of the world-wide Marian Year, proclaimed by Pope John Paul II, Hungarians
remembered the 50th anniversary of the XXXIV Eucharistic World Congress of 1938 in
Budapest, and also the 950th anniversary of the death of Saint Stephen, the founder of the
Christian kingdom of Hungary. A symP.osium devoted to the memory of the holy King was
jointly held by the Bishops' Conference and the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, June 2122, 1988. The "feudal king Stephen I," whose role as builder of the state was belittled in the
history books of the last forty years, had regained his title "Saint" as he is called now even
by the Marxist historians and in the government media.

He is highly praised for his

statecraft and his accomplishments which have been of lasting significance for the Hungarian
nation. This "rehabilitation" process reached its high-water mark when on August 20, the
feast day of St. Stephen, renamed Constitution Day since the Communist take-over, Politburo
member Janos Berecz, the HSWP's Central Committee Secretary for ideology, hailed Stephen
as "the first among the great Hungarians and great ancestors whose memory and work is
'
sacred to all decent patriots." Furthermore, he assured the p ublic that the present
government was willing to act "in the spirit of St. Stephen's continually valid message." 1 4
Religious celebrations of St. Stephen's Year, as 1988 was named by the Catholic Bishops'
Conference, were organized countrywide. At specific dates, the ornate reliquary with the
Holy Right--the preserved right hand of St. Stephen--was transported by armored car of
the state police to each episcopal see, and there it was exposed to veneration in the cathedral
and/or the largest public square. On August 19, at Szekesfehervar, the city where the holy
King was buried, Bruno Straub, the President of the Hungarian People's Republic, gave the
festive address.

In the presence of the special Papal Legate, Archbishop Francesco

Colasuonno, and other distinguished guests, Straub praised St. Stephen for his wisdom of
learning about the world surrounding his country and for recognizing the necessity of timely
constitutional changes in order to survive. Applying this wisdom to today's situation, he
declared that the key to Hungary's further development was "the respect for democracy."
This was unimaginable "without constitutional arrangements of the relations between the state
and the citizens and also between the state power and the church." 15
On August 20, St. Stephen's Day, an outdoor mass was celebrated by Cardinal Primate
Paskai on the steps of the St. Stephen Basilica in Budapest before a crowd estimated at
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40,000. 16 Before the mass the Cardinal read the letter of Pope John Paul II addressed to
Hungarian Catholics and then he repeated St. Stephen's offering the country to the Holy
Virgin, the Magna Domina Hungarorum. At the end of the ceremonies, he announced that
the government and the bishops had invited His Holiness the Pope to visit Hungary_l7 The
entire event was broadcast live by the Hungarian state television.

Perhaps the most

noteworthy in all this is what was transpiring in the official speeches and writings celebrating
the first king, namely the message that Hungary is at a difficult turning point, just as it was
at St. Stephen's time. The leadership, therefore, needs the support of a united people in
·
facing the arduous task of a complete overhaul of the socio-economic structure. 18
... and the Tide Rushes in

The process of revolutionary changes in Hungary which began in
1 989 to an astonishing degree.

I 988

accelerated by

The "establishment" Communists were forced into the

defensive even within their own party. The reform-wing, led by Politburo member Imre
Pozsgai who advocates the transformation of the Party into a Western European type of
Social Democracy, is slowly but surely gaining the upper hand. 19 The government of Miklos
Nemeth,.Jt.Young Harvard educated economist, has committed itself to hold multi-party free
elections by June I 990 at the latest. The Communist Party (HSWP) was pressured to sit down
to round table discussions with the opposition groups and to agree to a new constitution
which would effectively put an end to its monopoly of power. As to the Party's monopoly
of information, that seems to have been finished for good. In Hungary today the freedom
of speech, of press and of assembly is a fact, regardless of the Party's intentions or wishes.
TV and radio commentators, journalists, cameramen, professionals, students, workers and
people in general, do not ask and wait for permission to organize clubs and associations, or
to write, broadcast, publish, and to sell publications, but just go ahead and do it. 20
The most extraordinary feat of the "opposition" and the most spectacular showing of their
strength was the solemn reburial of Imre Nagy, the Prime Minister of the 1 956 Revolution
who had been executed as a traitor by his erstwhile cabinet colleague, Janos Kadar. The
rehabilitation of Nagy and the Revolution had been fiercely opposed by Party General
Secretary Karoly Grosz and the majority of his Politburo until virtually the last minute;
however, the preparations went ahead and when the date arrived on June 16, the 31st
anniversary of the executions, over 200,000 paid their homage on Budapest's Heroes' Square
to the victims of the repression which followed the I 956 Revolution. Since it was a day of
work, the rest of the nation watched on TV at their work place or at home the impressive
ceremonies which included prayers and blessing of the graves by clergy of the Christian and
Jewish faiths. Among those present were Prime Minister Nemeth, the leader of the reform-
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wing of the Party, Minister of the State and member of the Politburo Pozsgai, as well as
official representatives of the Soviet Union and of nearly all of the socialist countries and of
the most important non-governing Communist parties, plus the Ambassador of the United
States among other dignitaries from the world over. Three weeks later, on July 6, the very
day Janos Kadar died, the Supreme Court of Hungary annulled all criminal charges against
Imre Nagy and his fellow defendants, declaring them to have been innocent victims of a
politically motivated frame-up.
Strange as it may sound, the reaction of the official leadership of the Churches to these
momentous events was timid and hesitant. On the eve of the reburial of Nagy, the leaders
of the Christian Churches and he Chief Rabbi of Hungary did issue a joint statement in
which they made a passing reference to. the "crucible of grave moral, spiritual, economic and
political crises" which the nation was passing through, but the rest of the document was only
a plea to all Hungarians for mutual forgiveness, exhorting them to renounce all thought of
revenge and to work instead together for a better future in harmony and love. 21
During the ever more heated debate about the re-evaluation of Hungary's recent past and
her future direction, the Churches remained passive; their muted voice was only rarely heard.
The discussions concerning the new constitution and its clause on the freedom of conscience
and of religion was conducted between the government, i.e., the Communists, and the
opposition groups, notably the most vocal among them, the Democratic Forum. 22 It was the
opposition which first raised the issue of the rehabilitation of the victims of religious
persecution and demanded the abolition of the notorious State Office for Church Affairs
which kept the Churches in bondage since its creation in 1 95 1 , while the Churches were
dutifully collaborating with the Office and were obeying its orders apparently without
murmur until its very demise in June 1 989. 23
To understand , if not to excuse this servile attitude, one should bear in mind the severe
oppression the Churches had to suffer for the past forty years and also the fact that it was
that very State Office for Church Affairs, and notably its long-time head Imre Mikl6s, 24 who
had a decisive say in filling all important posts in the Churches. This was especially true in
the Protestant denominations where the traditional right of the congregations to elect their
presiding officers had been subverted and effectively eliminated by the Communists. Even
in the Catholic Church, the Holy See needed the consent of the government to all episcopal
appointments; 25 otherwise, the bishop was prevented to occupy his see and exercise his
office.

As a result, all church leaders were Miklos' appointees who were selected by him

exactly because of their propensity to follow government orders and not show too much
independence. It is no surprise therefore that in the Protestant Churches the clergy and the
laity are in the process of forcing the resignation and replacement of their bishops and lay
leaders whom they accuse of excessive collaboration with the Communists; 26 in the Catholic
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Church there is pressure on Primate Paskai from some of his fellow bishops, but also from
the lower clergy and from laymen, to show more initiative and vigour vis-a-vis the regime
in demanding the restoration of the rights of the church.
This pressure from below was perhaps behind the unprecedented decision of the Catholic
Bishops' Conference to call a meeting of all the superiors of the religious orders, male and
female, which existed in Hungary before 1 950 when, with few exceptions, they were banned,
and to urge them to reorganize their orders and congregations immediately, in other words,
without waiting for the impending new legislation on religion. 27 While the bishops had the
verbal assent of the government to this action, it was still a bold decision to go ahead without
proper legal authorization.
The Bishops Speak

Amidst the rapid political changes in 1 989, it became increasingly difficult for anybody
to avoid taking a position. The burning need for "glasnost," "transparency" as to the Christian
attitude for the restructuring of public life finally prompted the Catholic Bishops'
Conference to issue a rather long statement "On the Renewal of Church Life and of Society,"
dated July 4, 1 989. 28 The introductory part of the statement deals with the post World War
II history of Hungary and contains a clear indictment of Communist policies in general and
their persecution of religion and of the Churches in particular.

Among the injustices

suffered, the imprisonment and show trials of the clergy are listed, and the rehabilitation of
the victims (among whom J6zsef Cardinal Mindszenty is mentioned by name) is demanded.
Gone are past platitudes about the "freedom of religion guaranteed by the Constitution"
and about the "harmonious and satisfactory relations between State and Church under
Communism" which Hungarian churchmen were forced to repeat ad nauseam both at home
and abroad. Instead, there is a sober assessment of the present economic and moral crises;
the blame for which is laid squarely on the shoulders of the Communists.

Their blind

obedience to an atheistic-materialistic ideology, their disregard of human dignity, their gross
incompetence and mismanagement of the economy, are held chiefly responsible for the
current ills.

In the bishops' view, only a spiritual and moral renewal can bring about a

successful restructuring of society. To this end they urge all believers to redouble their
efforts in order to achieve a true renewal of Church life which would revitalize society at
large. Moreover, the bishops pointed out, while the Church refrains from prescribing or
recommending any particular type of political system, she did develop the broad principles
of a Catholic social doctrine and this should help Christians in their endeavor to build a j ust
society. The Church pledges its support to this great task, although the Church is concerned
that after forty years of enforced silence and various disabilities imposed on it, it might not
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be able to live up to all expectations and demands. These greatly exceed its actual strength
and resources.
Th e Road Ahead

There is indeed a difficult road ahead for Hungary, not only on the way to economic
recovery but even more so in terms of moral renewal. The bankruptcy of the so-called
"communist morality" which was supposed to replace traditional Christian ethics and morals,
has been evident for some time and had been admitted even by the Communists. 29 The main
reason for the latter's change of attitude toward religion and the Churches was precisely their
awareness of a deepening moral crises, the phenomenal growth of alcoholism, the rise in
crimes of all kinds, of suicide, abortion, and juvenile delinquency. One could say that the
regime turned to the Churches for help in desperation over these worsening social ills. But
how much help will the Church be able to give?
To be sure, it is an immense relief for the Churches to have regained their freedom from
state interference in their internal life and to be able to exercise their mission of unhindered
evangelization. But would it not be too much to expect from the clergy whose number had
greatly diminished and whose average age is over 60 years to shed suddenly all traces of the
dependence and subservience to which they were accustomed and to show a vigorous spirit
of creative initiative and apostolic zeal in mastering and applying up-to-date pastoral care
to their flock? Similarly, while the readmission of the religious orders and congregations to
their ministry is certainly an invaluable bonus for the Catholic Church, one has to bear in
mind that the dissolution of these communities was ordered in 1 950, so that the very
youngest of their few surviving members are now in their sixties. It would take years before
they could rebuild their human resources to such strength that they might again staff the
number of schools, hospitals, and other institutions for which they once have cared.
What makes, however, the situation even more serious is that in the meantime two
generations have grown up without religious instruction; in fact, they were taught that
religion was nothing but superstition, contrary to science.

Most of today's adults are

woefully ignorant of the basic tenets of the Christian faith and morals.

Although the

prohibition on religious instruction has been lifted, where would the Churches find enough
qualified teachers of religion needed for the schools which up until now were the temples of
atheism? A nd then the gravest question of all: how many of the parents--the majority, even
in baptized , are non-practicing Christians--would ask for religious instruction to be given
to their children? 30
To balance this rather gloomy outlook for the immediate future of religion in Hungary,
there are some indicators which point toward a more positive outcome. The most significant
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among these, and of the greatest importance, is the strong religious revival in recent years.
This was observed among the population at large, but it seems to have the most remarkable
impact on young people, especially the students. 31 The phenomenon can be explained, at
least partially, by the general disillusion with Marxism-Leninism but also with the
materialism of Western consumerism, prompting people to turn toward spiritual values. In
any case, this change of hearts, if it means true conversion and is not just a fad, does give
hope for a genuine revitalization of Church life and, in a larger sense, provides hope for a
restructuring of the whole society along more humane and spiritual values.32
The Soviet Connection
Returning now to the starting point of this essay the question remains, what influence,
if any, has Gorbachev had on the developments in Hungary described on these pages? The
connection is indeed tenuous; however, in my opinion it was and is of decisive importance.
I submit that the developments in Hungary would not have occurred so fast and would
not have been so far reaching in such a short time, had it not been for Gorbachev and his
own commitment to radical reforms. As I had mentioned already, reformers everywhere in
the Communist world were encouraged by the General Secretary's bold actions against those
dragging their feet and trying to sabotage the reforms, while the conservative hard-liners
were disheartened.
A lso, in the area of church-state relations, it must have been easier for the Hungarian
Communists to grant concessions and, ultimately, to put into effect significant reforms, when
they saw Raisa Gorbachev at the Bolshoi Opera join the highest church dignitaries from all
over the world to celebrate the millennium of the conversion of Rus to Christianity.
Furthermore, they must have read about the draft legislation prepared for the Supreme
Soviet on freedom of religion and learned about the gradual relaxation of anti-religious
activities and of the modest but real improvement in Church life in the Soviet Union.
Conversely, there is a real fear in Hungary and elsewhere that should Gorbachev fail-
and that would most likely mean a backsliding into a Stalinist restoration, or a military
dictatorship- - then the reforms within the Soviet Bloc might be also doomed. The massacre
on Tiananmen Square in Beijing, seen on live television in Hungary, still haunts those
welcoming reforms. It is said that there are quite a few good Christians nowadays who offer
daily prayers for the good health and long life of CPSU General Secretary Mikhail
Gorbachev.
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Curtain"- -which still existed then between Hungary and the West--twice in a single day.
18Markos, p. 1 6 .
1 9During a heated two-day meeting o f the 1 1 3 member Central Committee o f the HSWP
on June 23-24, 1 989, the reformer Rezs6 Nyers was elected as Chairman of the Party.
Although Karoly Grosz retained his post of General Secretary, he had to share power i n the
newly created Party Presidium with the two top reformers Nyers and Pozsgai, and Prime
Minister Nemeth who in recent months tended to side with the reformists. At the same time
a leading "conservative," Janos Berecz was removed as Secretary in charge of ideology and
propaganda. It should be noted that the reform-wing of the Party, composed of "Reform
Circles" from across the country, held a national conference at Szeged on May 2 1 -22, 1 989.
Although an open split was avoided , it was evident that the HSWP is deeply divided, almost
to a point of being two parties in rivalry with each other.
2 0Parliament gave its ex-post-facto sanction to an already existing situation when in
September 1 989 it passed a most liberal piece of legislation regarding freedom of press and
information.
2 1 Text of the Declaration in Merleg (Munich), Vol. XXV, No. 2 ( 1 989), p. 1 1 3 .
22See the draft Declaration adopted by the Democratic Forum regarding the Freedom of
conscience, freedom of religion and enforcement of morality in public life, in Hitel, Vol. II,
No. 1 1 (24 May 1 989), pp. 53-54.
The government's proposal, "Principles of a Law on Freedom of Conscience, the Right
of Free Exercise of Religion, and Church Affairs," was submitted for public debate in June
1 989. These "principles" are basically the same which were communicated to Primate Paskai
the year before, as I have described earlier in this essay. This new, public document is
currently being discussed in church forums and by congregations of the various
denominations throughout the country. A revised and enlarged version, incorporating new
proposals and amendments formulated in the course of these debates, will serve as the basis
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for the draft law to be submitted to parliament in 1 990. See, Edith Oltay, "Abolition of State
Office for Church Affairs Marks Turn in Church-State Relations," RFE Research, Vol. 1 4 ,
No. 2 5 (23 June 1 989), pp. 37-4 1 .
23The Office was abolished on June 1 5, 1 989.
24Mikl6s was a high ranking official in the Office since its establishment in 1 9 5 1 and
its head for the past 1 8 years. He was unceremoniously forced into retirement on May 1 ,
1 989.
2 5See the "Legal Regulation No. 20/ 1 9 5 1 of the Presidential Council of the People's
Republic," in Emeric Andras and Julius Morel, Hungarian Catholicism: a Handbook (Toronto:
St. Elizabeth of Hungary Parish, 1 983), p. 1 75.
26See, Paul Mojzes, "A Free Episcopal Election in Hungary: Social Ferment and Religious
Revival in Yugoslavia," Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe, Vol. VII, No. 6,
(December 1 987) pp. 1 -6; and the bitter criticism of the Protestant church leadership by
A rpad Fasang Jr. , "Mit cselekedjem?" (What Should I Do?), and by Calvinist Minister Pal
Nemeth, "Hazugsag es arulas" (Lie and Treason) on the pages of Hitel, Vol. II, No. 1 1 (May
24, 1 989), pp. 1 7- 1 8 .
27The historic meeting o f the heads of all religious orders, male and female, was held
under the chairmanship of the recently appointed Coadjutor-Bishop of Szekesfehervar,
Carmelite friar Nandor Takacs, 1 2 April 1 989 in Budapest. Some 200 persons were present.
See the report by one of the participants, Emeric Andras, S.J., director of the Vienna based
Hungarian Institute for Sociology of Religion (HIS) in HIS-Press-Service, No. 36 (April
1 989), pp. 1 -4.
28The text of the Declaration was printed in the July 9, 1 989 issue of the Catholic weekly
Uj Ember but otherwise it was given scant publicity: only few priests read it from the
pulpit, or recommended its reading to their parishioners, nor was it mentioned in the secular
media. Otherwise well-informed Hungarians profess complete ignorance as to its existence
and content. In view of the importance of this pronouncement by the Catholic hierarchy at
this turning point in Hungarian history, the lack of publicity is baffling.
29I have described the social ills in Hungary in an earlier study, "Religion in a Communist
Consumer Society: The Case of Kadar's Hungary," OPREE, Vol. I, No. 5 (September 1 98 1 ),
pp. 1 - 1 0. The somber picture I painted then on the basis of sociological studies published
in Hungary had been reinforced by the 1 986 report, "Tarsadalmi beilleszkedesi zavarok
Magyarorszagon" (Disorders in Societal Adaptation in Hungary), commissioned by the
Council of Ministers, cited by Imre Andras, "A magyar egyhaz emberformal6 feladata es az
uj vallasiigyi t6rveny" (The Mission of the Church in the Formation of Man and the New
Law on Religion), Katolikus Szemle (Rome), Vol. XL, No. 4 (Winter 1 988), p. 356.
3 0See, Tamas Nyiri, "Egyhaz a mai magyar tarsadalomban" (The Church in Today's
Hungarian Society), Katolikus Szemle, Vol. XLI, Nos. 2-3 ( 1 989), pp. 1 5 1 -1 66. This double
issue of Katolikus Szemle reproduces the lecture series "Foldinduhis Magyarorszagon"
(Earthquake in Hungary), which was the theme of the Thirty-first Congress of the Catholic
Hungarian University Movement-Pax Romana, held March 27 - April 1 , 1 989 in Reichenau,
Germany. (NB. "Earthquake" was used as a simile for the dramatic socio-political changes
in Hungary.)
31 The 9 July 1988 issue of the official organ of the HSWP, Nepszabadsag, contained a
report of a round- table conference on the topic "Is the Influence of Religion Increasing in
Hungary?." State Secretary Imre Miklos, as well as the leaders of the KISZ, the Federation
of Young Communists, had to concede that there was indeed a resurgence of interest in
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religion among the young people of Hungary. Magyar Kurir (French edition), 3 August
1 98 8 , pp. 1 6- 1 9.
An 1 8 page confidential report in my possession which was prepared for the Politburo
by the Social Policy Committee of the HSWP Central Committee, entitled "On the State of
Church Policy and Proposal for Its Reform," recognizes as a fact that a religious revival is
taking place in Hungary, first of all among the youth. The report dated 1 4 March 1 989,
suggested that the Party drop its unpopular anti-religious stance, permit freedom of religious
belief and practice to party members and start recruiting new members among religious
believers. The plenum of the HSWP Central Committee meeting on 28 July accepted the
report's definition of the HSWP as "a party of social progress but not an atheist party" and
invited religious believers to join the Party without fear of discrimination.
32A hopeful sign pointing toward a better future is the resolution passed by the
overwhelming majority of the delegates to the Extraordinary Party Congress of the HSWP
meeting in Budapest 6-9 October 1 989 which, in effect, transforms the Party into a new
Hungarian Socialist Party whose platform incJudes respect for human rights, multi-party
parliamentary democracy and an economy responsive to market forces. Reformist Rezs6
Nyers replaced Karoly Grosz as leader of the Party.
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